University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2010

The Future of Taxation
Joseph Isenbergh
Joseph.Isenbergh@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Isenbergh, "The Future of Taxation" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 509, 2010).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 509
(2D SERIES)

The Future of Taxation
Joseph Isenbergh

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
January 2010, revised September 2010
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

THE FUTURE OF TAXATION
Joseph Isenbergh*

Of course, taxation has a future. Its presence somewhere on the scene is proverbially as
certain as that of the grim reaper. But where, and in what guise? On that front, I’ll try to
look just a bit further here than this morning’s financial pages. On some aspects of the
future tax landscape I can in fact offer a precise picture, framed with arithmetic certainty;
on others mere conjecture, laced with pure aspiration or even fantasy.

An important first step in thinking about the future of taxation, unsurprisingly, is a look at
its past and present. To gain more than a surface view, it is essential to appreciate the
difference between real taxes and current (or nominal) taxes. The real tax over any
significant period is the level of government spending in relation to national output. The
higher public spending as a percentage of GDP, the higher the real tax. That amount must
in time be transferred from private to public hands—be it now or later. The current tax,
for its part, is the amount actually paid to a government in any given period, and is almost
never equal to the real tax.

The level of current taxes in the future follows arithmetically from their level in the
present in relation to the real tax. A current tax lower than the real tax (that is, a public
deficit) implies higher current taxes in the future, while a current tax higher than the real
tax (a public surplus—a phenomenon observable in only three of the past 50 years)
implies lower current taxes in the future. Deferred taxes are simply claims against the
public. There are two ways to meet these claims: 1) higher current taxes in some future
period or 2) inflating the claims away. Inflation, which generally induces a shift of wealth
from private to public hands, is the functional equivalent of a tax increase. These
relations do not follow from any policy or ideology, but are purely matters of arithmetic.
The stated political orientation of the administration presiding over a gap between current
and real taxation—be it social democratic or of the supply-side right—does not matter.
*
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Viewed in this light, the record on taxation of the previous four administrations is
strikingly different from widespread perception. Real taxes (federal spending as a
percentage of GDP, remember) reached a peacetime high (prior to 2008) during the
Reagan administration (at 23.5 percent of GDP in 1983) and maintained nearly that level
(holding consistently at or above 22 percent) through the first (GHW) Bush
administration. Real taxes fell considerably during the Clinton years (to a low of 18.4
percent of GDP in 2000). Real taxes then rose sharply in the second (GW) Bush
administration. You may not have appreciated it at the time, but in real effect taxes were
lowered substantially during the Clinton administration and were raised significantly in
the Bush II administration. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were mirages.

The fiscal policy habitually associated with social-democratic political orientation is taxand-spend. Considering the true nature of taxation, what passed as supply-side fiscal
policy in the past 30 years boils down to spend-and-tax. In the bigger picture there is little
or no functional difference between them. The spend level in these patterns drives the tax
level either way. Self-styled supply-side economics in the 1980s, and then again earlier in
this century, was simply old-style fiscal stimulus, Keynesian policy delivered on the tax
side. It implied no significant possibility of lower taxes over time.

Filtered through ideological lenses, a number of myths have emerged about those times.
One, for example, is the myth of prodigious economic growth during the 1980s. To
illustrate, average real GDP growth during the Reagan and Bush I administrations was a
whopping 3 percent. In contrast, during the Carter administration average real GDP
growth was a puny 3.2 percent. During the second (GW) Bush administration real GDP
growth averaged 2.4 percent. The only period in the past three decades where something
roughly akin to supply-side economics has been practiced in our economy—and by this I
mean lower real taxes acting as a spur to economic output—was the latter half of the
1990s, during which average real GDP growth of 4 percent comfortably outpaced growth
during the self-styled supply-side administrations.

The Future of Taxation
Joseph Isenbergh

3

In this look at the future of taxation I promised arithmetic certainty, and here it is. Over
the next 10 to 15 years current taxes will increase mightily. I take no position here on the
necessity or wisdom of massive fiscal stimulus to restart the U.S. economy. But it has
arrived—and in its wake will pull up current taxes for a decade at least (or spread
inflation, another form of higher taxation).

The only question still in doubt is the form higher future taxes will take and who will pay
them. While current taxes and deferred taxes in the aggregate add up to the real tax in any
given period, there is one crucial difference between them. We know the form of current
taxes and, roughly, who pays them. All I can say about future taxes is that they will be
higher. Beyond that I can’t say who will pay them—whether consumers or savers,
suppliers of capital or suppliers of labor, or both in a maelstrom of inflation.

Tax planning with respect to future taxes is therefore as much as anything an exercise in
political action. What appears on the surface to be public debate over the appropriate
level of taxation—and this goes on all the time—is in fact political maneuver by
interested constituencies to get out of the line of fire of inevitable tax increases while
deflecting the higher taxes onto someone else.

Having exhausted (and in barely three pages) the limits of certainty on these matters, I
can offer, for the rest, only conjecture and wishful thinking. On the latter front, like
many, I have a view of the best regime of taxation for the future, which I have spun
together in the pages that follow. Unsurprisingly, it is largely based on my understanding
of the role of the tax system in our recent financial and economic woes.

A number of commentators pondering our current financial and economic condition have
observed that during the past decade people in America saved too little while in Asia
people saved too much. Although obviously reductionist, this account has considerable
force. Our own consumption, fueled by debt, outstripped our incomes in recent years,
while foreign savers, predominantly from Asia, financed the bulk of new investment in
the U.S. economy. In that light predictions have surfaced of late that to set right the
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imbalances in our spending and saving (“imbalance” being the standard euphemism for
our decade-long spending binge) we will become savers again in upcoming years.

Although the baseline observation is sound—we did not save enough earlier in this
century to foster long-term growth or even to sustain our current standard of living—I
rather doubt the corollary. Of course we will save somewhat more in upcoming years
than we did in the past few. We could hardly save less, because it is hard to save less than
zero for more than a brief while when you are already deep in debt. But whether there is a
substantial and abiding change in our macroeconomic habits depends importantly on
taxation in the future.

Let me explain. I believe that our tax system contributed significantly to our national
orgy of leverage, in ways both large and small. This is so because the U.S. income tax
system imposes a heavier burden on personal saving than on immediate consumption,
and particularly favors consumption fueled by debt. Most readers understand this, but
compulsively I’ll explain it anyway. When income from labor is saved rather than
consumed, the income from that saving (now capital income, in economic terms) is taxed
again. This “second” tax on saving makes the tax cost of capital income greater than that
of labor income spent on immediate consumption. The particular strain of income
taxation indigenous to the United States exacerbates this tendency. The two separate
layers of income tax imposed on corporate earnings and then again on dividends
distributed to shareholders actually imply a third tax on corporate profits. This goes far
toward explaining why we don’t save.

That said, there has self-evidently been new investment in the U.S. economy in recent
years. Where did the capital come from? Not from us, but from foreign savers,
particularly those Asians who, as noted, save so much. An obvious question is: why
aren’t foreign savers put off by our double tax on capital income? The answer is that they
would be, if they paid it. But they don’t. For many people—although surely not for
readers here—it would come as a surprise to learn that the baseline U.S. tax rate on
capital income derived from the United States by foreign savers is zero. We reward
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foreigners for saving and investing in the United States with zero taxation, and we punish
ourselves for doing the same with double taxation of capital income. Given our present
fiscal straits, why don’t we tax the capital income of foreign savers? Because we can’t.
Foreign savers, unlike us, are free to take their saving and investment to any tax
environment of their choosing. We are entirely dependent on them and must let them in
and out of U.S. capital markets at no tax cost.

In this light I think that the best way (and perhaps the only way) to bring capital
formation in the U.S. economy in line with the demands of the future is a major
reorientation of the U.S. tax system—specifically a shift in the burden of taxation away
from capital income and onto consumption. In short, some form of consumption tax
should be the predominant national tax.

Let me explain what I mean by a consumption tax. Turnover-type taxes such as sales
taxes and value-added taxes are widely and correctly understood as consumption taxes.
But for present purposes, so is any tax that does not reach capital income. The allocative
effect of sales taxes, value-added taxes, and taxes imposed solely on labor income (such
as payroll taxes) is much the same over time, because none entails a second tax on
saving.

Mechanically, rather than adopt a value-added tax or a national sales tax, I would propose
to transform the U.S. tax system by converting the income tax into a tax on consumed
income. A tax on consumed income is an income tax in which personal saving is
deductible from taxable income, thus excluding capital income and leaving only the
amount of income that is consumed subject to current taxation. At the same time I would
propose to extend the reach of payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are also consumption taxes
because capital income is excluded from the amount taxed at the threshold. The
combined measures I just described therefore add up to a consumption tax regime.

But why, you might ask, adopt this particular combination of consumed income and
payroll taxes rather than, say, a value-added tax, which is a special favorite of many
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advocates of consumption taxes? A value-added tax, I’ll concede, may be easier to
administer and enforce than a tax on consumed income. But that is so only if the valueadded tax is flat and comprehensive. If you attempt to inject elements of progressivity
and redistribution into a value-added tax—for example, by varying the level for different
types of goods and services—it becomes both more complex and less efficient. Another
problem with a value-added tax is that people can to a considerable extent earn their
incomes in one tax environment and spend them (either at retail on vacation or wholesale
in retirement) in a different (and VAT-free) environment, so that ultimately both their
incomes and their consumption are untaxed.

To put this point more broadly, value-added taxes and payroll taxes are analogous to an
income tax that is imposed territorially, whereas a tax on consumed income is imposed
on worldwide income, minus the component of saving, and is therefore a tax on the
worldwide consumption of a taxpayer.

A further advantage of these proposals is that transition from the present tax system to a
tax on consumed income is easier than its replacement by a value-added tax. As for
payroll taxes, they are already in place. We need only change their range and rate
structure. On the income tax side, a tax on consumed income would emerge simply from
the overlay of something like unlimited individual retirement accounts. Of course, more
would have to be done, including a new regime for debt incurred and repaid by
individuals. The core mechanism of a tax on consumed income, however, entails little
more than the introduction of one or more types of individual saving and investment
accounts.1 Amounts paid into these accounts would be deductible from taxable income,
and withdrawals includible. This regime also encompasses gifts and bequests, along with
current consumption and saving.

Even more importantly, taxes on consumed income and payroll taxes can be structured as
progressive taxes. Social democrats tend to recoil from consumption taxes as

1

An entity such as a corporation or an LLC owned by an individual could also serve as a tax-deferred
investment account.
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insufficiently redistributive. But taxes on consumed income and payroll taxes can be
graduated, even steeply so. Uncap the payroll tax and add a substantial exemption
amount both to it and to the consumed income tax in the lower range, and you have
remade the U.S. tax system as a graduated and redistributive consumption tax—aspects
that should pacify at least some social democrats—while still leaving capital income
untaxed.

In somewhat subversive fashion this regime would also meet one of the stated objectives
of the Obama administration on tax policy. The administration has asserted the goal of
taxing the foreign and domestic operations of U.S. corporations equally. I agree with this
goal, but through my particular prism on the question. Both the foreign and domestic
operations of U.S. corporations should be untaxed or lightly taxed. Such a tax regime
would place us, as savers, on the same footing as our worthy counterparts in Asia.

Having spun this fiscal fantasy for readers’ amusement, I must admit that it brings to
mind the cartoon characters of old, who would dash off the edge of a cliff and remain
briefly suspended in mid-air, their little legs churning madly, before crashing to the
ground. My proposals and others like them are unwelcome, or worse, at every point along
the ideological spectrum. On the left, social democrats by and large cannot abide taxes
that do not reach capital income. On the right, supply-siders are dogmatically opposed to
all new taxes and will keep chanting to the end of time that the only good tax is a low tax.

Given that—and shifting for the moment from fantasy to pragmatic forecast—what
manner of taxation can we expect in upcoming years? First, as noted, taxes will be
higher. Anyone who can add understands this; all pronouncements on taxation from the
Obama administration confirm it. The administration has also indicated strongly that
taxes on capital income will rise more, in relative terms, than taxes on labor income. This
general drift is reflected as well in the mood of Congress. Those within the ranks who are
looking to take a bigger bite from no one except the plutocrats who got us into our
present fix appear to overmatch, both in numbers and influence, the dwindling few still
pitching the supply-side miracle.
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At the same time, the tax measures adopted in the next few years will most likely include
a cluster of special provisions aimed ostensibly at promoting saving and capital
formation. These will take the form of targeted investment incentives—such as rapid
depreciation and the usual array of hearth, hot rod, and jobs credits—along with new
vessels for tax-deferred saving, perhaps 401(x), (y), and (z) plans.

Targeted investment incentives in the form of special allowances grafted onto an income
tax, however, are not worth the price. Selective tax benefits of this sort may well channel
investment into favored areas, but at the cost of significant misallocation, and without
lifting the basic tax burden on capital formation. To dispel any lingering doubt of such a
misallocative effect, consider the story of owner-occupied housing in the past decade.
Systematic subsidies for home ownership delivered by our tax system—along with
various pathologies of the financial system—channeled saving and investment into
housing beyond reason, leaving us with bloated inventories that will take years to work
off. But despite the battery of incentives for this particular form of capital formation, our
net personal saving dwindled to nothing, as we borrowed to consume against illusory
home equity.

Tax-deferred saving vehicles (such as 401(k) plans) also do not work. Perversely, they
may even reduce saving. First, people with 401(k) plans can borrow to consume in their
taxable environment (on home equity, for example). Second, a 401(k) plan converts longterm capital gains that accrue in the plan into high-taxed ordinary income, and thus may
actually increase the tax burden on capital income in the end. Lower-income savers can
overcome this effect by contributing to a Roth 401(k) plan, but these are not yet widely
available to most employees.

There will also be, no doubt, some new taxes on consumption, but cast in various stealth
guises and not broad-based. Among them, perhaps, will be a carbon or a BTU tax, or
their implicit cousin Cap and Trade.
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If the taxation of the future looks substantially like what I have just outlined, our national
habits of capital formation will not change appreciably. Rather, personal saving will
remain anemic as far as the eye can see and we will continue to draw investment capital
from foreign savers, which, as always, we will not tax.

My reasons for these expectations on future taxation—which I believe to be realistic—are
grounded largely in the current political landscape. In steering clear of increased taxes on
consumption, the Obama administration will have an unexpected ally on the right, in the
form of unrepentant supply-siders. Supply-siders will of course oppose tax increases on
capital income. But, because any and all tax increases are against their religion, they will
also oppose higher taxes on consumption, the necessity of which they refuse to
acknowledge. Therefore, faced with the inexorable arithmetic of higher taxes in due
course, the administration and Congress will find the path of least resistance to be raising
taxes on capital income. The supply-siders will rage on, naturally, but will have no
answer for the manifest shortfall in their own fiscal arithmetic. Hence, increased taxes on
capital income will slouch through our political process over their ineffective resistance.
Readers with long memories will recall that something similar happened in the gestation
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The 1986 Act went through extensive ministrations by
the Treasury and congressional committees, culminating in one of the heavier tax
increases on capital income (relative to labor income) in our history, and turned out in the
main to be a social-democratic tax law garlanded with a few supply-side gestures.

There is one more thing. Taxes in the next ten years, even though considerably higher
than today’s, will nonetheless be insufficient, in all likelihood, to fill the revenue gap that
opened wide during the last ten (and will persist for a few more). Somewhere in the mix,
therefore, expect significant inflation. Because it decreases the value of deferred claims
against treasuries, inflation provides governments some relief from fiscal straits they have
spent themselves into. And because inflation, at least on the surface, operates outside the
political process, it is ever present as a last resort open to governments and to markets.
Above all, once you have given up on the alternatives, inflation is all that remains. For a
government, it is like letting go to the pull of gravity. This does not necessarily mean, let
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me add, 1970s-style 12-percent inflation,2 but considerably more than today’s. When can
we expect it? I can’t say for sure. Maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but soon and,
for those of us already on the back nine, for the rest of our lives.

I have not even mentioned thus far a conceivable third way to pacify deferred taxes:
reduce spending to the level of the current tax, or below. Even though this has happened
within memory—in the 1990s—it won’t happen again for a long while. We are a world
away from the gridlock of the 1990s. The current administration still sees only new
horizons, while the backbenchers have every reason to persist in the win-win clamor for
tax cuts without asking anyone to give up anything, for fear of unmasking the supply-side
illusion.

The problem runs deeper, in fact, than the particular composition of Congress today. It
may well be that allocatively neutral fiscal policy is impossible in a democracy, however
admirable that form of government may be in other respects. That is because rent-seeking
has a particularly wide range in tax measures massaged through the political process.
Commonly (and justifiably) we associate rent-seeking with special interests and
minorities. But rent-seeking is not the unique province of small well-connected groups. In
tax matters there are rent-seeking opportunities for majorities. The tax laws are shot
through with reallocation both to narrow minorities and to the great majority, the latter
being reflected most evidently in a rate structure that collects the bulk of federal income
taxes from a narrow band at the top of the income range. To be sure, the approach to
taxation that I have sketched here by no means attains perfect allocative neutrality. But it
comes closer to that end, both nationally and internationally, than what we have today or
are likely to have tomorrow. That, however, is no advantage in the legislative trenches.

2

While there are similarities between today’s monetary and financial environment and that of the 1970s—
an era that was the perfect incubator for inflation—there is at least one crucial difference. Currently the
money supply is expanding rapidly as we emerge from a recession compounded initially by high oil and
commodities prices. To that extent, the situation is strongly reminiscent of 1976-77. The vital difference,
however, is China. In 1977 China—just throwing off the Cultural Revolution—had an insignificant role in
the world economy. Today China is a prodigious producer and purveyor along the entire spectrum of
consumable goods—in effect a Wal-Mart to the world. If the 2010 version of China had been there in 1977,
we would likely still have had inflation, but considerably less.
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Taking a step back from the fray, it seems to me that on both ends of the political
spectrum there is remarkably little concern with the allocative effects of taxation in its
various forms. From their pronouncements on the question, in fact, it appears that both
social democrats and supply-siders minimize, or even ignore altogether, differences in
allocative effect among different taxes, although from diametrically opposite
perspectives. By this I mean that social democrats tend to question whether differences in
taxation have any allocative effect at all, while supply-siders hold indiscriminately that
all taxes, simply by being taxes and especially by being high, have large and adverse
allocative effect. To put the point more technically, social democrats hold that the income
effect of most taxes overwhelms the substitution effect, while for supply-siders the
substitution effect of all taxes overwhelms the income effect. That is why social
democrats contend that higher taxes on income (and in particular income from capital)
will have little effect on the level and distribution of economic activity, and supply-siders
for their part insist that any and all tax increases and new taxes of any stripe will crush
economic activity and starve the Treasury.

What I have to contribute on these questions is a simple and important point: that it
matters how you tax. Different taxes do have different allocative effects. My concern
about future taxes is not that they will be higher—there we have no choice—but that they
will perpetuate or even compound the misallocative effects of the present tax system.

I should add, in closing, that I have no illusions about the influence of this concern on the
future of the tax system—I know better. My purpose in these remarks is simply to get on
record some positions on fundamental questions, so that in a decade or two, should I be
so lucky as to be around, I will be able to compare notes with others who take different
positions on these issues, and perhaps to say: I told you so. Some day, as my second
grade teacher used to say, you’ll realize.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Joseph Isenbergh
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jisenber@uchicago.edu
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